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The ABC of the OPT, the award-winning new publication by three outstanding
Israeli scholars and jurists – Orna Ben-Naftali, Michael Sfard and Hedi Viterbo –
demonstrates, in a masterly fashion, the use and abuse of the laws of belligerent
occupation as a masquerade for raw power and as a tool for oppression. The
authors illustrate, using the format of a legal lexicon dedicated to specific legal terms
and rhetorical devices (or newspeak), how the distorted application of the laws
of belligerent occupation by Israeli lawyers and judges has conferred an aura of
decency and legitimacy upon the long and open-ended occupation of the West Bank.
This approach draws its intellectual roots from classic insights of critical legal studies
– e.g., that law is chronically malleable to abuse and that law constitutes politics
through other means.
This critical approach is particularly suitable for application to the Israeli occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza, which featured a very high degree of legalism and
where the true political implications and motivations behind measures taken were
hidden from the international community (vis-à-vis which a façade of ‘disputed
territories’ had been employed in lieu of outright annexation) and large segments of
the Israeli public (which regarded the oppression and dispossession in the Occupied
Territories as practically reversible and morally negligible in view of the value
attached to the ‘bigger picture’ of regional peace and security). The book’s exposure
of the resort to belligerent occupation law as a disguise for policies that undercut
its underlying principles is a cautionary tale about the limits of international law in
constraining power, and about its restricted ability to shape and direct the exercise of
public authority.         
Still, an even broader lesson may be drawn about the laws of belligerent occupation
– a lesson for which the Israeli-Palestinian cases represents only one, albeit
prominent, case study. It is a stark reality that, with the possible exception of early
20th century conflicts, the laws of belligerent occupation have been mostly honored
in the breach. In most cases (Germany, Japan, Northern Cyprus, Western Sahara,
Georgia, Crimea), occupying forces denied the very applicability of the laws of
belligerent occupation, and in those few cases in which they were applied (Iraq,
Palestine), major deviations from basic principles of belligerent occupation law have
occurred. Arguably, this state of affairs can be explained by reference to structural
reasons. Section III of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which laid down the basic
principles of belligerent occupation law (that the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention
built upon), was based on 19th century assumptions about military occupation: That
it would be of a relatively short duration (terminating in a peace treaty or annexation),
and that, as a result, it is founded on the notion of temporariness; that the occupier
holds the territory as a trustee for the actual sovereign; and that the purpose of the
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laws of occupation is to protect the interest of the local population in preserving
public order and safety (l’ordre et la vie publics) during such times of transition.
The belligerent occupations of the 20th and 21st century appear to follow a very
different logic. They are long-term or open-ended (Palestine), aimed at radically
transforming the political situation in the territory in question – often intended to
facilitate a regime change (Germany, Japan, Iraq), unlawful annexation (Crimea,
Western Sahara) or secession (Georgia, Northern Cyprus). Situations of belligerent
occupation also feature, at times, high levels of violence (Iraq, Palestine), which
obfuscate the distinction between the conduct and closure of active hostilities on
which many norms of the laws of belligerent occupation are premised.
All of these developments underscore the limited fit between belligerent occupation
law and the political reality it strives to regulate. Under such conditions, it is not
surprising that political forces push the law in different directions – facilitating on the
one hand excessively restrictive interpretations of safeguards found in belligerent
occupation law (under the guise of interpretive theories, ranging from ‘original
intent’ to ‘dynamic interpretation’), and on the other hand attempts to complement
shortcoming in belligerent occupation law through resort to international human
rights law and domestic law. This does not detract from the lexicon’s important
critical remarks about the elasticity of the laws of belligerent occupation as applied
by the Israeli authorities; it however contextualizes the Israel-Palestine case study
as one more illustration of the limited ability of the laws of belligerent occupation to
shape the conduct of occupying powers (perhaps underscoring the continued partial
relevance of Hersch Lauterpacht’s famous quip about international humanitarian law
being at the vanishing point of international law).
What is exceptional about the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is that unlike
other modern occupiers, Israel attempted to pursue policies which run contrary to
the basic tenets of the laws of belligerent occupation while resorting to extensive
interpretation and application of these very same laws. It is interesting to note that
Israel itself avoided the formal application of the laws of belligerent occupation over
territories where it could muster domestic support for annexation (East Jerusalem,
Golan Heights), or where it was able to establish on the ground looser modalities
of control than those found in the areas of the West Bank it actively administers
(post-2005 Gaza, South Lebanon, and Area A of the West Bank – whose day
to day administration is performed by the Palestinian Authority). It is only with
respect to Areas B and C of the West Bank, where day-to-day military control
is intensive, but whose annexation would generate considerable domestic and
international opposition, that Israel now resorts to the laws of belligerent occupation
as a normative point of departure for its policies.   
The book also discusses in detail the involvement of judges and lawyers in
facilitating the distortion of the laws of belligerent occupation through elastic
interpretation of its key terms (e.g., assigned residence), ignoring the plain language
of the law (such as in the case of the blanket ban on deportations found in article
49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and invoking impressible restrictions on the
scope of protected rights (such as in the case of invoking deterrence as the basis for
- 2 -
house demolitions, notwithstanding the language of article 53 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention). There is no doubt in my eyes that this is indeed the case, and that the
legal machinery of the Israeli occupation is based on a systematic misconstruction
of the laws of belligerent occupation, which run contrary to some of its key principles
(e.g., temporariness, status quo, prioritization of rights of protected persons etc.).
Still, it would be a mistake to ignore the power-limiting implications of the introduction
of a bureaucratic framework through which international law is applied. This allows
individuals, in some cases, to navigate the system in ways that protect their rights
and interests (e.g., regaining seized land or obtaining compensation for harm
unlawfully inflicted) and does complicate and raise the costs associated with taking
certain government measures. By operating as a side constraint on power, the laws
of belligerent occupation did lead in certain cases to important changes in policy.
For example, following the Supreme Court’s Ajuri judgment, which tied the policy of
‘assigned residence’ to individual culpability of deported/assigned family members
of suspected terrorists, the policy was suspended. International criticism of the legal
positions taken by Israeli officials have also led to the abandonment of the policy
of deportation of terrorists, and for a short period of time also of house demolitions
(at the recommendation of the Israeli military; the policy was reintroduced due to
a combination of political pressure to respond resolutely to terror attacks and the
Israel Security Agency’s belief in the effectiveness of the policy). Attempts to apply
Israeli law directly to the West Bank through legal instruments such as the 2017
Regularisation Law, which clearly violates the provisions of protection of private
property in occupied territories, might fail for similar reasons (and indeed, the
Attorney General has taken the extraordinary step of supportinng a pending petition
against the Kneseet to nullify the law in question).
In fact, it is the restraining power of formal adherence to the rule of law and the
‘enlightened occupation’ myth of the first years of occupation, which resulted in the
introduction of judicial review over Israeli Defense Force activities in the occupied
territories and in the creation of associated judicial remedies, as well as in certain
liberal initiatives such as the suspension of the death penalty in the Occupied
Territories. The existence of legal restraints has arguably rendered the occupation
less cruel than what it would have been otherwise, and thus more legitimate in the
eyes of Israelis and outside observers (at least until the first intifada, which brought
about the collapse of the ‘enlightened occupation’ myth); such a perception appears
to have contributed to its long duration. In the aftermath of the first intifada, which
led to more brutal oppression measures by Israel, the occupation was transformed
into a complicated system of direct and indirect rule, involving Israel, the Palestinian
Authority and the siege around Gaza.
Finally, the book seems to downplay the fact that Israeli politicians, lawyers and
judges have not adopted a uniform approach towards the laws of belligerent
occupation. To the contrary, the laws of belligerent occupation remain a battleground
for pursuing competing legal and political conceptions. For example, one can find
important judicial decisions that rejected governmental policies which were based
on controversial readings of the laws of belligerent occupation (e.g., the Elon Moreh
judgment, removing settlements built on private land, the 443 judgment, that required
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opening a main road to Palestinian traffic, and the human shields judgment that
outlawed the practice of using local civilians in arrest operations). At the same time,
some judicial decisions fully endorsed other governmental policies based on equally
controversial legal constructions (e.g., judgments on the legality of deportations and
house demolitions), or failed to challenge them (e.g., by holding that the policy of
constructing settlement non-justiciable). While all Israeli judges put their country’s
interest first, there is a real debate what that interest is, and how much weight
traditional understanding of the laws of belligerent occupation should be afforded in
limiting policy choices.
Still, the tide appears to be turning. More extreme Israeli politicians push for
annexationist policies and advocate increased cruelty vis-à-vis Palestinian terrorists
and their relatives (removing prisoner benefits, reconsidering the ban on the death
penalties, calling for resumption of deportations/assigning residence of family
members of suspected terrorists) – as part of a more general populist turn in Israeli
politics. Such initiatives are met nowadays with a hesitant reaction from the Israeli
judiciary, which has become over time more conservative and more complaisant.
Although the Regularization Law may represent ‘one bridge too far’ and will probably
be struck down by the Court, similar expropriation policies are already implemented
through more subtle measures, which meet little judicial resistance (e.g., declaration
of contested land as ‘state land’ on which settlements can be built according to
Israeli case law, use of good faith as an excuse against demolition of illegal outposts,
referring to settlers into local residents under Hague regulations).
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